what's the source of that info? the closest i found was 1250 cruise rg, so rule of thumb combat radius would be c.420Km
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what's the source of that info? the closest i found was 1250 cruise rg, so rule of thumb combat radius would be c.420KmCombat radius was only 900 km or thereabouts as I mentioned above. As far as multi engine bombers is concerned, pretty pathetic.
A few books and a couple online articles (easily searchable). Figures are consistent over these multiple sources.what's the source of that info?
excellent non-answer. well done.A few books and a couple online articles (easily searchable). Figures are consistent over these multiple sources.
Given that the more modern Ki-21 and Ki-48 had radiuses in the 1200 km range, I consider the 900 km figure for the older Ki-1 to be entirely believable.excellent non-answer. well done.
also, couldn't find information about any airfields existing before 1944, in Palau; seems only sea-planes stationed there up to beginning of pacific war.
we know those operations were covered by A5Ms & B5Ns from the Ryujo & F1M2s from a couple seaplane tenders.Interesting - take a look at this campaign map from December 1941. Granted it does not provide an evidentiary suggestion from before December 1941, but it is certainly earlier than 1944.
https://i0.wp.com/amti2016.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/3.jpg
See the two expeditionary assault lines emanating westward from the Palau island group (Pelelieu, Koror, Anguar), an island group the Japanese had owned since 1914. Forces from here also assaulted Legazpi in southeastern Luzon, and Davao in southern Mindanao, in December 1941 Both the Davao and Legazpi operations were conducted at ranges from the Palaus easily reaching several eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies (like Sulawesi/Celebes and the Malukus and Western New Guinea).
Do we think the Japanese launched these amphibious task forces from Palau without organic land based aircraft supporting them from Palau, having them totally reliant on carrier aircraft from the underway task force for air support until they captured airfields in the Philippines ashore? Was that "doable"?
Or if land based air support was a minimum operational requirement for a Japanese landing operation, and the Palaus and Mandates did not provide it, did aircraft from another direction, like Taiwan, provide that land-based air support, and it is just not shown on the map? Taiwan-based air coverage to the far southeast of Luzon to legazpi peninsula seems a plausible no brainer. But all the way down to Davao on the southern end of Mindanao in the southern Philippines? Did the Dec. 1941 Japanese bombers have the reach from Taiwan to Davao? Or should we infer support came from another direction?
Oh, so it was all "fake it till you make it" sea-based air-support until airfields ashore were captured. No land-based air support. BTW, have't read it yet, but just got access last night to a monograph on IJN 11th air fleet history of the PI campaign written up for the occupation. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/pdfs/JM-80/JM-80.pdfwe know those operations were covered by A5Ms & B5Ns from the Ryujo & F1M2s from a couple seaplane tenders.
Interesting regarding Dutch threat perceptions.The UK was a big threat of course. This because it was the absolute naval top dog and because it had been the last entity to occupy the archipelago during the Napoleonic Wars. At the turn of the century both Japan and China were seen as the upcoming adversary and Yellow Peril, with Japan seen as no. 1 enemy after the Russo-Japanese War.
They could lie. And only slowly reveal, bit by bit, through their actions, that their promises were fake. Yeah, they could make fake promises, and fake apologies, and excuses. Lying and doublespeak were part of their repertoire in addition to macho-talk.If Japan would do that, what would be the point of the occupation? Furthermore, I doubt that imperial Japan was ideologically able to make such a promise, let alone fulfill it.
The military sure didn't "what"? accept helplessness in the face of a coup de main? Because it had the KM counter-strategy of submarine attacks?The military sure didn't. The KNIL realized it was only really able to fight a battle on Java, with forces in the Outer Regions stationed there for police-purposes and to serve as trip-wires. The KM on the other hand was being build - after WWI - to counter the coup-de-main through concerted submarine attacks.
I wonder if the Japanese could do a Tarakan coup de main and Manado in a synchronized, simultaneous fashion, to retain surprise and chances at capturing Tarakan facilities undamaged, but also securing SLOCs, for longer term in case of counterattacks, foreign intervention, or unexpected setbacks or delays that require additional effort to finish the job at Tarakan. Manado on Sulawesi/Celebes is a shorter sailing distance from the Palaus and provides a stepping stone between them and Borneo/Kalimantan, while enveloping the Philippines from the south.- Is the Japanese navy willing to capture Tarakan without first securing it's SLOCs by the capture of Menado? In WWII the offensive of the DEI was planned to be quite methodic in its nature.
Interesting and important point. Unilateral Dutch counterattacks just wouldn't be a viable thing outside Java and Sumatra.There will not be a Dutch counterattack that's for sure. Neither the KNIL or the KM were set up for that. Any counteroffensive will need direct foreign involvement. At least for places like Borneo, Celebes or the rest of the Outer Regions. Java or Sumatra is a different story, but certainly not completely.
Curious - how were the oilfields and oil production distributed throughout the islands of the NEI archipelago.
I got the vague impression, just based on map symbols for oilfields and their density, that they ranked sort of like this:
1) Borneo/Kalimantan
2) Sumatra
3) Celebes/Sulawesi
4) Java
5) all others less, but New Guinea/West Irian next in rank, if any, just from size?
Good point, it certainly would, and it certainly fit in with my thematic concept of enthusiastic Navy Officers pushing forward an operation for parochial Naval service interests (over the Army's) in addition to personal glory and the nation and Emperor's glory. For that purpose, a more "bite size" objective of a coup de main of prominent oil ports on a subset of islands, rather than a grand fleet assembly and DoW for an all-out, comprehensive invasion, are a better fit.In fact, wouldn't a more crazy IJN help this scenario? What if the Navy pulls a 'Marco Polo bridge' by staging a coup-de-main attack without the government knowing about it?
Good points again.Certainly before an attack in Java that would be the case. KNIL-forces on Java would number some 40,000 though, would the IJN be able to muster a force to defeat that? Having this whole thing mainly be a IJN affair would make this interesting when the UK gets involved and things go South, what would that do to the inter-service war?
Mahan was very popular within the KM and segments of politics.I would note, in parallel with the section I bolded, that in Mahan's original Impact of Sea Power on History, from the 1880s, he cited China as a potential up and coming power and basically ignored Japan. I think several countries overrated the potential of China's self-strengthening reforms, and arms builds and purchases in the late 19th century.
Yes they did, with that mostly concerning the Chinese in the period after the Chinese Revolution, and the Japanese after WWI.Your mention of the "yellow peril" term makes me wonder if the Dutch were thinking in terms of "hybrid" threats from the Japanese and Chinese in particular, involving their modern or semi-modern fleets to some extent, but also "spies, saboteurs, and agents" among their immigrant diaspora of laborers and merchants in the East Indies colonies.
Of course they could lie, but it would be very clear that they would be.They could lie. And only slowly reveal, bit by bit, through their actions, that their promises were fake. Yeah, they could make fake promises, and fake apologies, and excuses. Lying and doublespeak were part of their repertoire in addition to macho-talk.
The military didn't feel they might be able to suck up a succesful coup de main. Basically everything outside of Java is lost when it's lost, if outside support isn't coming anyway. Hell, even the KNIL on Java had for quite some time a plan for a redoubt in the Preanger mountains, as a counter-attack was deemed to be very hard to pull off.The military sure didn't "what"? accept helplessness in the face of a coup de main? Because it had the KM counter-strategy of submarine attacks?
This should be doable, though risky. If the Dutch get even a hint of it the garrisons get put on alert, negating the element of surprise and risking the destruction of the oil facilities. If there is more credible intel the KM could send its submarines north which risks interception.I wonder if the Japanese could do a Tarakan coup de main and Manado in a synchronized, simultaneous fashion, to retain surprise and chances at capturing Tarakan facilities undamaged, but also securing SLOCs, for longer term in case of counterattacks, foreign intervention, or unexpected setbacks or delays that require additional effort to finish the job at Tarakan. Manado on Sulawesi/Celebes is a shorter sailing distance from the Palaus and provides a stepping stone between them and Borneo/Kalimantan, while enveloping the Philippines from the south.
If we want to be precies everything outside of Java and Madura (the island very near to Soerabaja) is deemed to be the Buitengewesten or Outer Regions. This is pretty much a 19th century way of looking at the archipelago though. After the adoption of direct governance around 1900 the islands outside of Java grew exponentially in (economic) importance. Java has relatively few oil reserves compared to Sumatra and Borneo for example. Personally I see the (parts of) the islands around the Java Sea as inner, and the rest as outer. So Balikpapan would be somewhat inner, while Tarakan would be outer, like Palembang is inner and Atjeh is outer.Interesting your defenition of "inner" seems to include Java and Sumatra, with everything else, including Borneo, being "outer". I think one of the other folks - possibly on a counterpart thread to this on another forum, was counting Java and Borneo as the "inner" with all the other islands as "outer"
I did see a source that said that Tarakan was producing 1/3 of DEI's oil, but that might be just about the Bataafsche Olie Maatschappij.Still curious on the below, anybody have knowledge on it:
Of course it was not literally war, although the inter-service rivalry did become violent at times, but it was a political war indeed. If the Navy goes rogue and pokes the European bears, this has political consequences. Positive consequences if they succeed, but very negative ones if they fail or get Japan involved in a gigantic war.Regarding the part I put in bold about the inter-service war.....the thing about Japanese inter-service war is that I think it is exaggerated if you are expecting it to mean Japanese Army and Navy commonly shoot at each other or repeatedly fail to support each other when under enemy fire. I don't think that happened much or that they deliberately did that to each other. They certainly had rivalry. They certainly competed for resources. They certainly each thought they knew best. They certainly did not fully trust each other and wastefully duplicated some capabilities, and probably literally stole logistic resources from each other, but they also multiple times commonly directed fire at the same enemy with synergistic effect, whether it was elegant or not. Their battling with each other was mainly budgetary and bureaucratic and by competitive bragging, not shooting each other. They could, and maybe on a couple occasions did, embarrass the other by leaving it in the lurch, or blame the other for its failure after working together. But if one could rescue the other, they might relish taking that chance too, so they could brag about it and hold it over the other. In this case, the Army probably would reinforce a navy DEI campaign that had insufficient naval infantry and firepower, on the expectation that it will be able to claim it was saving the day and could later say "I told you so".
http://www.combinedfleet.com/Oil.htmCurious - how were the oilfields and oil production distributed throughout the islands of the NEI archipelago.
I got the vague impression, just based on map symbols for oilfields and their density, that they ranked sort of like this:
1) Borneo/Kalimantan
2) Sumatra
3) Celebes/Sulawesi
4) Java
5) all others less, but New Guinea/West Irian next in rank, if any, just from size?
Which Chinese revolution?with that mostly concerning the Chinese in the period after the Chinese Revolution,
This one!The 1911 Xinhai Republican Double-Ten revolution?
Gotcha! Well, a lot of the activists behind the disturbances setting it off in southern China, and people who had made previous attempts and been organized in secret societies had done a good bit of their fund-raising and lived and worked in the Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora, including the Dutch East Indies.....as well as Hawaii, North America, Australia, etc., so not the wildest network or group of potential plotters to worry about, even if a "stretch."This one!
it was apply suitable air cover, based on what intel says is the expected defense in the objective area: &, unlike much of the later war, japanese intel was pretty good regarding defenses in the PI.Oh, so it was all "fake it till you make it" sea-based air-support until airfields ashore were captured. No land-based air support. BTW, have't read it yet, but just got access last night to a monograph on IJN 11th air fleet history of the PI campaign written up for the occupation. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/pdfs/JM-80/JM-80.pdf