Just the sheer distance for any land based air unless the Japanese have bases much closer than I'm aware of.
Just the sheer distance for any land based air unless the Japanese have bases much closer than I'm aware of.Why would that be?
If Japan would do that, what would be the point of the occupation? Furthermore, I doubt that imperial Japan was ideologically able to make such a promise, let alone fulfill it.If the Japanese were smart they would declare all preexisting deals with foreign businesses would be honoured, and try to encourage further investment. Even dutch ones, if they would sign an armistice.
And all Europeans would be treated very politely.
Of course that assumes a level of control over their soldiers conduct that they didn't have irl.
Ah, in that regard you mean. The range of Japanese air-units in late 1941 was amazing, I don't know if that was the case in 1936. Regardless the Japanese forces are bound to capture airfields in the DEI. Wouldn't they ferry airforce (or better said, Army-aircorps) planes to those fields to use in operations?Just the sheer distance for any land based air unless the Japanese have bases much closer than I'm aware of.
Interesting idea - at what points in time did the Dutch ever articulate such fears of a potential assault like this? When was the earliest point?There are possibilities of less totallistic objectives though. In fact, one of the greatest fear of the Netherlands was that Japan would perform a coup de main attack on one or more oil ports, like Tarakan or Balikpapan (though Batavia was certainly a feared option as well).
I agreeIf the Japanese were smart they would declare all preexisting deals with foreign businesses would be honoured, and try to encourage further investment. Even dutch ones, if they would sign an armistice.
And all Europeans would be treated very politely.
It may be much more possible than you think, especially the more Navy-dominated compared to Army-dominated the operation is. The Navy was more civilized, westernized, less peasant, less brutalized by its officers, and less eager to keep that shit rolling downhill onto others. Its officer corps had a decent English-language proficiency. Against the Dutch alone, the Special Naval Landing Forces, ground forces under the Navy Ministry and General Staff in their service, could do a majority of the ground combat work.Of course that assumes a level of control over their soldiers conduct that they didn't have irl.
He sounds like another one who just read the title, ignored paragraphs in the original post, and ignored the existence of the Mandated Islands in Micronesia that offer preexisting airfields for the Japanese.Ah, in that regard you mean. The range of Japanese air-units in late 1941 was amazing, I don't know if that was the case in 1936. Regardless the Japanese forces are bound to capture airfields in the DEI. Wouldn't they ferry airforce (or better said, Army-aircorps) planes to those fields to use in operations?
From the late 19th century out. This was in part caused by the military weakness of the Dutch forces in the DEI. A deliberate attack was unstoppable, while a defense against a coup-de-main had some chance of succeeding, so the latter was chosen as the most likeliest scenario. In my TL (SHAMELESS PLUG) I describe the debate on the defense of the colony in detail.Interesting idea - at what points in time did the Dutch ever articulate such fears of a potential assault like this? When was the earliest point?
Generally the fear was that after the capture the Japanese occupation would be fait accompli. Foreign intervention would still be possibility but the chance on that would be much diminished. The aftermath would be out of the military's hands so didn't get much attention. The Foreign office mainly considered the whole thing unlikely and was convinced the British - if not other powers - would not let it happen (after the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance anyways).What sort of approach did the Dutch authorities and military think Japan would take in the aftermath of a coup de main attack on one or more oil ports? Set the stage for diplomatic negotiations and some sort of settlement? Consisting of what, some sort of ownership stake and right to a protective garrison? Some guaranteed delivery schedule? Other economic concessions on opening the market to Japanese exports, business and immigration? What permanent enforcement mechanism did they think the Japanese might have in mind?
The military sure didn't. The KNIL realized it was only really able to fight a battle on Java, with forces in the Outer Regions stationed there for police-purposes and to serve as trip-wires. The KM on the other hand was being build - after WWI - to counter the coup-de-main through concerted submarine attacks.Did the Dutch feel they might have to just suck up a coup de main and only mitigate it diplomatically, like a hostage negotiation? Fight with no thought or word of concessions or tributes? Or wait and see how strong local forces would be and how much help the Netherlands could attain in the region?
Good question. It may help to look at what the IJN/IJA used in 1942 to conquer Tarakan and Menado. These would also be the most dangerous attacks from a Dutch POV, as the chances to detect the opposing force in time for the submarines to concentrate and attack the invasion force would be greatly diminished, while a coup-de-main on Java's ports would be much easier to intercept. An important factor will be the level of surprise the Japanese are able (or willing!) to achieve.What type of force, with what type of logistic footprint, would it take to execute a "bolt from the blue" coup de main on Tarakan, or Balikpapan, or Batavia? And how detectable would it be in advance?
There will not be a Dutch counterattack that's for sure. Neither the KNIL or the KM were set up for that. Any counteroffensive will need direct foreign involvement. At least for places like Borneo, Celebes or the rest of the Outer Regions. Java or Sumatra is a different story, but certainly not completely.And could it credibly hold any of these locations for a substantial amount of time, without a broader attack, to prevent an effective Dutch counterattack and siege for awhile, and certainly guarantee the destruction of property in the course of military recovery operations?
More likely, still means the UK and others will be upset.What about a coup de main executed after contentious trade talks that break down, so there is less surprise as a tactical and strategic advantage for the Japanese, but the attack seems a little less bizarre.
Meh, I have my doubts about that. The history of WWII is rife with IJN autrocities. IMHO the difference is mainly one of opportunity. The nature of naval warfare lends itself less for large scale autrocities.The Navy was more civilized, westernized, less peasant, less brutalized by its officers, and less eager to keep that shit rolling downhill onto others. Its officer corps had a decent English-language proficiency.
Certainly before an attack in Java that would be the case. KNIL-forces on Java would number some 40,000 though, would the IJN be able to muster a force to defeat that? Having this whole thing mainly be a IJN affair would make this interesting when the UK gets involved and things go South, what would that do to the inter-service war?Against the Dutch alone, the Special Naval Landing Forces, ground forces under the Navy Ministry and General Staff in their service, could do a majority of the ground combat work.
See above.Against a western opponent, the Japanese would not expect meek submission and easy buyouts they would expect from Chinese, and stand-up resistance would not surprise or outrage them nearly as much.
Curious - how were the oilfields and oil production distributed throughout the islands of the NEI archipelago.From the late 19th century out. This was in part caused by the military weakness of the Dutch forces in the DEI. A deliberate attack was unstoppable, while a defense against a coup-de-main had some chance of succeeding, so the latter was chosen as the most likeliest scenario. In my TL (SHAMELESS PLUG) I describe the debate on the defense of the colony in detail.
Generally the fear was that after the capture the Japanese occupation would be fait accompli. Foreign intervention would still be possibility but the chance on that would be much diminished. The aftermath would be out of the military's hands so didn't get much attention. The Foreign office mainly considered the whole thing unlikely and was convinced the British - if not other powers - would not let it happen (after the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance anyways).
The military sure didn't. The KNIL realized it was only really able to fight a battle on Java, with forces in the Outer Regions stationed there for police-purposes and to serve as trip-wires. The KM on the other hand was being build - after WWI - to counter the coup-de-main through concerted submarine attacks.
Good question. It may help to look at what the IJN/IJA used in 1942 to conquer Tarakan and Menado. These would also be the most dangerous attacks from a Dutch POV, as the chances to detect the opposing force in time for the submarines to concentrate and attack the invasion force would be greatly diminished, while a coup-de-main on Java's ports would be much easier to intercept. An important factor will be the level of surprise the Japanese are able (or willing!) to achieve.
A total 'bolt from the blue' attack on Tarakan would mean that the DEI government doesn't suspect any Japanese shenanigans at all and the garrison is in complete peace-mode. There will be some guards posted but most probable barely any crewed naval guns. If a Japanese invasion fleet backed by heavy cruiserw comes thundering in port at midnight the whole operation could be over before morning light. There are a few caveats though:
- Is the Japanese government willing to alienate the international community this much this early?
- Is the Japanese navy willing to capture Tarakan without first securing it's SLOCs by the capture of Menado? In WWII the offensive of the DEI was planned to be quite methodic in its nature.
- Are the Japanese able to keep the operation secret enough?
There will not be a Dutch counterattack that's for sure. Neither the KNIL or the KM were set up for that. Any counteroffensive will need direct foreign involvement. At least for places like Borneo, Celebes or the rest of the Outer Regions. Java or Sumatra is a different story, but certainly not completely.
More likely, still means the UK and others will be upset.
Meh, I have my doubts about that. The history of WWII is rife with IJN autrocities. IMHO the difference is mainly one of opportunity. The nature of naval warfare lends itself less for large scale autrocities.
In fact, wouldn't a more crazy IJN help this scenario? What if the Navy pulls a 'Marco Polo bridge' by staging a coup-de-main attack without the government knowing about it?
Certainly before an attack in Java that would be the case. KNIL-forces on Java would number some 40,000 though, would the IJN be able to muster a force to defeat that? Having this whole thing mainly be a IJN affair would make this interesting when the UK gets involved and things go South, what would that do to the inter-service war?
See above.
Comparatively speaking, the IJA still make them look like choirboys. At least the IJN was headed by people who were outwardly honourable and wished to avoid war.Meh, I have my doubts about that. The history of WWII is rife with IJN autrocities. IMHO the difference is mainly one of opportunity. The nature of naval warfare lends itself less for large scale autrocities.
I don't know about that. History proved Japanese long range BB gunfire accuracy to be abysmal.In particular, Japanese doctrine of sitting at long range is likely to be murderously effective given that most of the British battle fleet’s limited capabilities in that range band.
By Leyte, Japanese gunnery skills had degraded for lack of practice, and more importantly, British battleships are larger and less nimble targets than the DDs, DEs, and even CVEs of Taffy 3.I don't know about that. History proved Japanese long range BB gunfire accuracy to be abysmal.
It wasn't too hot in 1942 in the NEI or at Guadalcanal either. The targets in the NEI were destroyer sized, I'll give you that, but at Second Naval Guadalcanal it was BB versus BB and the Japanese scored only a single hit using their 14 inchers despite their vaunted night fighting expertise.By Leyte, Japanese gunnery skills had degraded for lack of practice, and more importantly, British battleships are larger and less nimble targets than the DDs, DEs, and even CVEs of Taffy 3.
I will admit that 3 hits out of 117 shells fired is pretty sad, yes.It wasn't too hot in 1942 in the NEI or at Guadalcanal either. The targets in the NEI were destroyer sized, I'll give you that, but at Second Naval Guadalcanal it was BB versus BB and the Japanese scored only a single hit using their 14 inchers despite their vaunted night fighting expertise.
The gunnery displayed at Java Sea was abmysal to be frank.It wasn't too hot in 1942 in the NEI or at Guadalcanal either. The targets in the NEI were destroyer sized, I'll give you that, but at Second Naval Guadalcanal it was BB versus BB and the Japanese scored only a single hit using their 14 inchers despite their vaunted night fighting expertise.
He sounds like another one who just read the title, ignored paragraphs in the original post, and ignored the existence of the Mandated Islands in Micronesia that offer preexisting airfields for the Japanese.
Your bolded point is exactly right, people, perhaps out of respect for logistics (which are important!), or *initial* operational dispositions (which also are important!) sometimes really, have way, way, too little operational imagination, put too little thought into operational problem solving and and how phasing and sequencing makes military operations work and it is how enemies can surprise and threaten you. Am I right @Carl Schwamberger?
Hmm... many reasonable folk reckon Yamamoto would have been hanged if he had survived on the basis of the execution of the survivors from USS Edsall, supposedly killed because the Combined Fleet took an age to sink their old destroyer.Comparatively speaking, the IJA still make them look like choirboys. At least the IJN was headed by people who were outwardly honourable and wished to avoid war.
Reaching like Dhalsim. If anyone would have been sent to the gallows it was Nagumo for being the commander on the spot. Yamamoto had no involvement whatsoever in that tragedy.Hmm... many reasonable folk reckon Yamamoto would have been hanged if he had survived on the basis of the execution of the survivors from USS Edsall, supposedly killed because the Combined Fleet took an age to sink their old destroyer.
The gunnery displayed at Java Sea was abmysal to be frank.
While the Brits have numerical superiority the Japanese fleet is ship for ship superior. In particular, Japanese doctrine of sitting at long range is likely to be murderously effective given that most of the British battle fleet’s limited capabilities in that range band.
You think Haruna, Fuso & Yamashiro could stand up to Hood, Nelson and Rodney?As far as an Anglo-Japanese war…
Japan has only three battleships worked up and active in 1936: Haruna, Fuso, and Yamashiro. Kongo, Kirishima, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, and Hyuga are all in various stages of working up. Hiei is still demilitarized and OTL would be modernized the next year.
On the British side, Renown, Warspite, and Malaya are stuck in dry dock being modernized. The remaining battleships can be committed as soon as they can be sent east.
While the Brits have numerical superiority the Japanese fleet is ship for ship superior. In particular, Japanese doctrine of sitting at long range is likely to be murderously effective given that most of the British battle fleet’s limited capabilities in that range band.
Nelson and Rodney would utterly curbstomp Fuso and Yamashiro.You think Haruna, Fuso & Yamashiro could stand up to Hood, Nelson and Rodney?