I - Anxiety
THE FINAL TRIAL OF ESTONIA
NOTE: THIS TIMELINE ASSUMES YOU HAVE READ THE DEATH OF RUSSIA TIMELINE AS IT IS A FANMADE SPIN-OFF FOR IT. MASSIVE SPOILERS AHEAD.
ANXIETY
Excerpt from “From Schadenfreude to Horror - Estonian Society and the Second Russian Civil War” by William Bulganin
NOTE: THIS TIMELINE ASSUMES YOU HAVE READ THE DEATH OF RUSSIA TIMELINE AS IT IS A FANMADE SPIN-OFF FOR IT. MASSIVE SPOILERS AHEAD.
ANXIETY
Excerpt from “From Schadenfreude to Horror - Estonian Society and the Second Russian Civil War” by William Bulganin
Suppose you were to ask an Estonian nationalist in 1992 what his three hopes for the future were. In that case, it is very likely that the destruction of Russia, the reconquest of Pechory and Jaanilinn and a nationalist government for Estonia would have been among them. For many Estonian nationalists, all three seemed to be insurmountable goals on the eve of the Second Russian Civil War - The neoliberal Laar government had driven the Jaegers out of the armed forces and Pechory appeared lost forever, solidly under Russian control in the new post-Soviet landscape. Most Estonians were more than pleased with the rapid and bloodless restoration of independence acquired in 1991 and despite antipathy towards Russia and a desire for Pechory, lacked the will to support these goals. In just a few years, these goals were achieved. Of course, if you were to ask the same nationalist about them just a few years later, he would likely mumble something along the lines of “at least it is over.”
Indeed, today most Estonians, while rejoicing in the victories gained from the Second Russian Civil War, lament the path that led to them - they are less likely to see them as victories but as rewards for centuries of suffering. The modern Estonian is one that has made peace with the past’s suffering through the Livonian Order, Poland-Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, the Czars, the nazis and the USSR in such a manner that the suffering of others has finally outshined it and rendered fears of returning to the past laughable. It has even managed to make Estonians feel sorry for Russia, even though it took decades and never really bore fruit in the form of concrete action from the government. Who is there to enslave the Estonians now, mutants?
Indeed, today most Estonians, while rejoicing in the victories gained from the Second Russian Civil War, lament the path that led to them - they are less likely to see them as victories but as rewards for centuries of suffering. The modern Estonian is one that has made peace with the past’s suffering through the Livonian Order, Poland-Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, the Czars, the nazis and the USSR in such a manner that the suffering of others has finally outshined it and rendered fears of returning to the past laughable. It has even managed to make Estonians feel sorry for Russia, even though it took decades and never really bore fruit in the form of concrete action from the government. Who is there to enslave the Estonians now, mutants?
[...]
The tranquil Estonia of today is a mirror image of Estonia in the month of October of the year 1993. The government of Estonia had kept its distance from the constitutional crisis but had maintained diplomatic support for Yeltsin. The Estonian populace had at the same time liked Yeltsin for being a democrat who brought down the USSR (enabling Estonia to break off), but at the same time disliked him for dragging his heels over removing leftover Soviet troops from Estonia for apparently no other reason than to intimidate Tallinn. Meanwhile, the parliamentarianists were widely reviled from Rutskoy to Nevzorov (the only parliamentarianist given even a little charity was Khasbulatov due to his Chechen heritage) - the popular conception was that they were ex-communists looking to remove the reformer Yeltsin. From the first signs of mayhem in Moscow, there were fears that communists could retake power in Russia and roll back into Estonia - complete with the deportations, KGB surveillance and the renewal of Russification.
When the footage from Ostankino arrived to grace Estonian TV sets that could catch Russian channels, the anxiety of a possible repeat of 1940 multiplied. Blood had been drawn, and the parliamentarists had won a victory over the government that could not stop them from showing the dead bodies. Almost all of Estonia tuned in at some point out of morbid curiosity and horror. VHS copies were recorded and preserved, with those who hadn’t seen it getting a chance to view it following the cessation of these broadcasts. The imagery of the bodies stuck with many, and when Grachev surrendered his forces to the Parliament, the anxiety grew and grew. A coup, a regime change, a return to form had just taken place in Russia. The entire country followed the events closely, and another hit audience was reached when Gaidar set up his government in Kaliningrad as the Russian-language Raadio 4 was ordered by the government to broadcast Gaidar’s speech as an attempt to push the local Russian minority, which was feared to soon become a fifth column, against the parliamentarists. The broadcast had as much tangible effect on the local Russian community as it did on the wider Russian community - very little. Still, as most Estonians of the time above the age of seven spoke Russian quite fluently, it was the record for Raadio 4 in terms of concurrent listeners at the time. Estonians were afraid and anxious about what would happen next in Russia.
Some immediately decided to leave Estonia, and ticket prices for ferries to Stockholm multiplied in anticipation of a Russian invasion in the coming years. These people were shamed in the media and ridiculed by commoners, but their fears were shared by everyone except some of the local Russians. While there were democrats among them who were against the eventual horror of the NSF, few had love for Yeltsin. The divide between the Estonians and the Russians was massive, with the former seeing the latter as colonists who had arrived at the same time their relatives were sent to Siberia and their independence stolen and the latter either lacking any understanding of the former’s grievances at best or justifying the actions of the USSR at worst. The Estonians wanted the Russians to learn and speak Estonian while the Russians wanted to maintain their Russian communities. So far, the government had taken a calm approach - major disturbances of public order had been avoided while the Russians still felt dissatisfied with a perceived lack of protection and the Estonians felt dissatisfied with still having to hear Russian in Tallinn.
One of the major issues was citizenship - Russians who couldn’t trace their ancestors to Estonian citizens were left without Estonian citizenship and given a choice of going through naturalization or departure. Naturalization entailed learning the Estonian language, a complex and distant member of the Finno-Ugric language family with just one million speakers that essentially has no use outside of Estonia aside from exile communities or the rare and minuscule Estonian villages in Abkhazia, Latvia and Siberia. The legal basis for this act was that most of the Russian community were not citizens of the Republic of Estonia de facto was annexed by the USSR in 1940 but de jure never ceased existing, complete with recognition by the West. From the Estonian perspective, Estonia merely restored control over occupied territories in 1991 similar to France in 1944 and had no obligation to grant citizenship. This was accepted by the West, but not by the Russian Federation and the Russian community in Estonia saw the Republic as a new entity that had arbitrarily deprived the vast majority of Russians of citizenship. Months before his death, President Yeltsin had even accused Estonia of establishing anti-Russian apartheid due to this issue. The ascendant parliamentarists were feared to have even less restraint in the pursuit of defending their ethnic brothers in the “near abroad.”
Actually, moves had been made even before the 1993 coup as attempts at referendums for the autonomy of two majority-Russian cities (Narva and Sillamäe) conducted by their municipal governments had taken place in the summer months of 1993. According to the Narva municipal government, the voter turnout for their referendum was 54% while Sillamäe boasted of a turnout of 60%. There was no ambition for independence or unification with Russia expressed at the referendums (both referendums spelt out what was being sought - autonomy within the Republic of Estonia) and the vote passed in both towns with margins indicating near-total approval of autonomy. Regardless of any excuses and apologetics, the referendums were declared null and void by Tallinn, followed by a public relations campaign in the county of Ida-Virumaa urging the local populace to remain with Estonia - complete with a visit by the young prime minister Mart Laar (albeit wearing a bulletproof vest under his suit). With the referendums in living memory, the fear of the parliamentarists coming grew - there was even a concrete indication that they might get support from the local Russians! Incidents of inter-ethnic crime became more common, motivated by both Russian triumphalism and Estonian bitterness.
When the footage from Ostankino arrived to grace Estonian TV sets that could catch Russian channels, the anxiety of a possible repeat of 1940 multiplied. Blood had been drawn, and the parliamentarists had won a victory over the government that could not stop them from showing the dead bodies. Almost all of Estonia tuned in at some point out of morbid curiosity and horror. VHS copies were recorded and preserved, with those who hadn’t seen it getting a chance to view it following the cessation of these broadcasts. The imagery of the bodies stuck with many, and when Grachev surrendered his forces to the Parliament, the anxiety grew and grew. A coup, a regime change, a return to form had just taken place in Russia. The entire country followed the events closely, and another hit audience was reached when Gaidar set up his government in Kaliningrad as the Russian-language Raadio 4 was ordered by the government to broadcast Gaidar’s speech as an attempt to push the local Russian minority, which was feared to soon become a fifth column, against the parliamentarists. The broadcast had as much tangible effect on the local Russian community as it did on the wider Russian community - very little. Still, as most Estonians of the time above the age of seven spoke Russian quite fluently, it was the record for Raadio 4 in terms of concurrent listeners at the time. Estonians were afraid and anxious about what would happen next in Russia.
Some immediately decided to leave Estonia, and ticket prices for ferries to Stockholm multiplied in anticipation of a Russian invasion in the coming years. These people were shamed in the media and ridiculed by commoners, but their fears were shared by everyone except some of the local Russians. While there were democrats among them who were against the eventual horror of the NSF, few had love for Yeltsin. The divide between the Estonians and the Russians was massive, with the former seeing the latter as colonists who had arrived at the same time their relatives were sent to Siberia and their independence stolen and the latter either lacking any understanding of the former’s grievances at best or justifying the actions of the USSR at worst. The Estonians wanted the Russians to learn and speak Estonian while the Russians wanted to maintain their Russian communities. So far, the government had taken a calm approach - major disturbances of public order had been avoided while the Russians still felt dissatisfied with a perceived lack of protection and the Estonians felt dissatisfied with still having to hear Russian in Tallinn.
One of the major issues was citizenship - Russians who couldn’t trace their ancestors to Estonian citizens were left without Estonian citizenship and given a choice of going through naturalization or departure. Naturalization entailed learning the Estonian language, a complex and distant member of the Finno-Ugric language family with just one million speakers that essentially has no use outside of Estonia aside from exile communities or the rare and minuscule Estonian villages in Abkhazia, Latvia and Siberia. The legal basis for this act was that most of the Russian community were not citizens of the Republic of Estonia de facto was annexed by the USSR in 1940 but de jure never ceased existing, complete with recognition by the West. From the Estonian perspective, Estonia merely restored control over occupied territories in 1991 similar to France in 1944 and had no obligation to grant citizenship. This was accepted by the West, but not by the Russian Federation and the Russian community in Estonia saw the Republic as a new entity that had arbitrarily deprived the vast majority of Russians of citizenship. Months before his death, President Yeltsin had even accused Estonia of establishing anti-Russian apartheid due to this issue. The ascendant parliamentarists were feared to have even less restraint in the pursuit of defending their ethnic brothers in the “near abroad.”
Actually, moves had been made even before the 1993 coup as attempts at referendums for the autonomy of two majority-Russian cities (Narva and Sillamäe) conducted by their municipal governments had taken place in the summer months of 1993. According to the Narva municipal government, the voter turnout for their referendum was 54% while Sillamäe boasted of a turnout of 60%. There was no ambition for independence or unification with Russia expressed at the referendums (both referendums spelt out what was being sought - autonomy within the Republic of Estonia) and the vote passed in both towns with margins indicating near-total approval of autonomy. Regardless of any excuses and apologetics, the referendums were declared null and void by Tallinn, followed by a public relations campaign in the county of Ida-Virumaa urging the local populace to remain with Estonia - complete with a visit by the young prime minister Mart Laar (albeit wearing a bulletproof vest under his suit). With the referendums in living memory, the fear of the parliamentarists coming grew - there was even a concrete indication that they might get support from the local Russians! Incidents of inter-ethnic crime became more common, motivated by both Russian triumphalism and Estonian bitterness.
Excerpt from “Kalevipoeg in Grozny” by Hannes Kaasik
Estonia, while having escaped bloodshed during the collapse of the Soviet Union and avoided bloodshed in the immediate aftermath of 1991, was still not a peaceful country at the levels of the Nordic countries that Estonia under the Laar government was aspiring to. In addition to the sharply increased crime rate and ethnic tensions, there were tensions within the Estonian military over its reconstruction. On one hand, there were the “old guard” leaders of the Estonian military who were in charge of the mainstream of the Estonian army. One could perhaps consider as the standard-bearer of this faction Ants Laaneots, also known as “Tanki-Ants” (An English equivalent could be Tank-Andy). While not the commander of the Estonian Defence Forces (Eesti Kaitsevägi - EDF), Laaneots had been in the Soviet army since 1966 until the August putsch of 1991, becoming a founding officer in the new EDF. Laaneots had gained enemies among the more unconventional and irregular Jaeger units of the Estonian army, who had operated in their own “bubble.” These units, most famously the Läänemaa Volunteer Jaeger Company, were led by nationalists who wished to see a vision for the Estonian army that would make it something of a peoples’ army instead of the NATO-like force championed by Laaneots.
A western direction for the Estonian army gained even more momentum as Aleksander Einseln, an Estonian emigre who had fought in Korea and Vietnam under the stars and stripes before reaching the rank of Colonel, accepted President Lennart Meri’s invitation to lead the EDF following the acquiescence of the US State Department. Einseln rapidly reformed the Estonian army, shaping it to become more like the US army that he was familiar with. The Jaeger units had little room in this army but had to be accepted at first.
Among the Jaeger units, the Läänemaa Volunteer Jaeger Company (Läänemaa Vabatahtlik Jäägrikompanii - LVJK) would turn out to be the most infamous. The LVJK acted like something between a mafia organization and a military unit, providing private security for firms and carrying out vigilante justice on local miscreants and criminals. Members of the LVJK were also almost universally nationalists, leading to a dismissive attitude by them towards Russians. It was perhaps this attitude that led them to conflict with HQ. Einseln, seeing their usefulness in maintaining order, decided to move them from the ethnically homogenous Läänemaa to the formerly closed port city of Paldiski to provide a counterweight to the Russian troops stationed there. However, the local conditions and amenities were considered to be insufficient and undignified by the LVJK, leading to them disobeying orders to relocate to Paldiski. The manner in which LVJK disobeyed orders raised many eyebrows, as a couple of weeks after staying put in their base at Pullapää in Läänemaa, the Jaeger commander Asso Kommer protested directly to Prime Minister Mart Laar, complaining of aforementioned conditions in Paldiski. A day later, Kommer was relieved of command by Einseln. Deciding to ignore Einseln’s orders, the Jaegers decided two days later to leave the EDF and maintain Kommer as their commander, eventually giving way to a standoff - the Pullapää crisis.
The standoff lasted for a few weeks in July, with the Jaeger faction enjoying popular support in the face of the malaise of the 1990s. Supporters of the Jaegers came to Pullapää to lend them a hand and raise their numbers. On the 31st of July, there was an expectation that the soldiers of the Kuperjanov Batallion from Võru would attack the Jaegers and lead to a battle - for one reason or another, this didn’t happen and the Jaegers soon decided to surrender as Laar rescinded the order to dissolve the Jaegers. Kommer’s second-in-command Jaak Mosin was arrested by KAPO (Kaitsepolitseiamet - Estonia’s intelligence service), shortly followed by Kommer himself after a firefight with police in November. In disgrace from the affair, Interior Minister Lagle Parek and Defence Minister Hain Rebas resigned from their posts, rocking the Laar government.
Had Russia remained under Yeltsin, it would have been very likely that this affair would have been the last we would have heard of the Jaegers, Mosin and Kommer. As Russia descended into chaos, the men who had even fought against their own government would prove to be the Estonians most intimately linked to the war that would define the 1990s.
A western direction for the Estonian army gained even more momentum as Aleksander Einseln, an Estonian emigre who had fought in Korea and Vietnam under the stars and stripes before reaching the rank of Colonel, accepted President Lennart Meri’s invitation to lead the EDF following the acquiescence of the US State Department. Einseln rapidly reformed the Estonian army, shaping it to become more like the US army that he was familiar with. The Jaeger units had little room in this army but had to be accepted at first.
Among the Jaeger units, the Läänemaa Volunteer Jaeger Company (Läänemaa Vabatahtlik Jäägrikompanii - LVJK) would turn out to be the most infamous. The LVJK acted like something between a mafia organization and a military unit, providing private security for firms and carrying out vigilante justice on local miscreants and criminals. Members of the LVJK were also almost universally nationalists, leading to a dismissive attitude by them towards Russians. It was perhaps this attitude that led them to conflict with HQ. Einseln, seeing their usefulness in maintaining order, decided to move them from the ethnically homogenous Läänemaa to the formerly closed port city of Paldiski to provide a counterweight to the Russian troops stationed there. However, the local conditions and amenities were considered to be insufficient and undignified by the LVJK, leading to them disobeying orders to relocate to Paldiski. The manner in which LVJK disobeyed orders raised many eyebrows, as a couple of weeks after staying put in their base at Pullapää in Läänemaa, the Jaeger commander Asso Kommer protested directly to Prime Minister Mart Laar, complaining of aforementioned conditions in Paldiski. A day later, Kommer was relieved of command by Einseln. Deciding to ignore Einseln’s orders, the Jaegers decided two days later to leave the EDF and maintain Kommer as their commander, eventually giving way to a standoff - the Pullapää crisis.
The standoff lasted for a few weeks in July, with the Jaeger faction enjoying popular support in the face of the malaise of the 1990s. Supporters of the Jaegers came to Pullapää to lend them a hand and raise their numbers. On the 31st of July, there was an expectation that the soldiers of the Kuperjanov Batallion from Võru would attack the Jaegers and lead to a battle - for one reason or another, this didn’t happen and the Jaegers soon decided to surrender as Laar rescinded the order to dissolve the Jaegers. Kommer’s second-in-command Jaak Mosin was arrested by KAPO (Kaitsepolitseiamet - Estonia’s intelligence service), shortly followed by Kommer himself after a firefight with police in November. In disgrace from the affair, Interior Minister Lagle Parek and Defence Minister Hain Rebas resigned from their posts, rocking the Laar government.
Had Russia remained under Yeltsin, it would have been very likely that this affair would have been the last we would have heard of the Jaegers, Mosin and Kommer. As Russia descended into chaos, the men who had even fought against their own government would prove to be the Estonians most intimately linked to the war that would define the 1990s.
Excerpt from “Rodeo: The Mart Laar Government 1992-1994” by Tanel Smuul
In October 1993, one of the most nervous leaders on the planet had to be Mart Laar. Laar and his government had a secret that would have severely complicated relations with Russia under Yeltsin, but almost certainly led to war under the new reality: the Chechen Rouble Deal.
In the process of disentangling Estonia from the USSR, a currency reform was declared to phase out the Soviet rouble and bring back the Estonian kroon. The reform had been long finished by the 1993 coup, leaving a glut of old and inflated roubles that had been exchanged for kroons to Estonians in the hands of the Estonian government. Under a deal between Russia and Estonia signed in 1992, these roubles would be handed over to Russia. Concurrently, worsening relations between Russia and Estonia led to Russia freezing Estonian assets in Russia - in response, Estonia decided to keep the roubles and sell them to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exchange for US Dollars. The roubles arrived in Grozny via diplomatic mail and the arrangement with Chechnya was concluded on the Estonian part by the spring of 1993, making the timing of the coup in Russia even more hazardous as the action was a done deal.
By the time of the coup, Estonia was still waiting on Chechnya to deliver the 2 million US dollars that the Estonians had given a couple of billion roubles for. With the new government in mainland Russia, there was little hope for a friendly settlement and anyone with knowledge was legally forced to treat the matter as a state secret. The rouble deal remained under classification for 10 years with the veil of secrecy only being lifted in 2004 by the Parts government. The two million US dollars arrived just as Russia was breaking apart, and we now know that the money was spent on pensions and weapons from Israel (the only willing vendor at the time).
The new NSF government lacked the patience and lethargy that the Yeltsin government had - Makashov demanded the return of the Soviet currency soon after taking office. Laar responded that this could only be negotiated with the “legitimate government of Russia” and could only occur after the Estonian assets were unfrozen. To this, the NSF threatened war in case the roubles somehow went missing and then insisted on the old deal continuing rather than the “separate matter” of Estonian business assets being involved in it. A panicked Laar then set out to specifically assure the NSF of the continued presence of the roubles in the hands of the Estonian Central Bank, but no evidence aside from assurances by Laar and the Bank of Estonia to this end was presented. These assurances were shortly followed by statements that the NSF couldn’t get the roubles either way. This diplomatic masquerade followed for months and fueled tensions between Estonia and Russia. It is believed by some that the NSF was somehow aware of the rouble deal, although there is no evidence to this end. The Gaidar government likewise restated its desire for the missing roubles but was also essentially rebuked by Estonia. Gaidar actually did legally unfreeze Estonian assets in Russia, but by this time it was purely a de jure action that had no effect at all - left with little excuse, Estonia simply refused to hand over the roubles to Gaidar until the unfreezing “properly materialized.” In the new shared horror of the NSF, this spat soured relations between Estonia and the Kaliningrad government, which is credited with at least not aiding Estonia in what happened after.
In the process of disentangling Estonia from the USSR, a currency reform was declared to phase out the Soviet rouble and bring back the Estonian kroon. The reform had been long finished by the 1993 coup, leaving a glut of old and inflated roubles that had been exchanged for kroons to Estonians in the hands of the Estonian government. Under a deal between Russia and Estonia signed in 1992, these roubles would be handed over to Russia. Concurrently, worsening relations between Russia and Estonia led to Russia freezing Estonian assets in Russia - in response, Estonia decided to keep the roubles and sell them to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exchange for US Dollars. The roubles arrived in Grozny via diplomatic mail and the arrangement with Chechnya was concluded on the Estonian part by the spring of 1993, making the timing of the coup in Russia even more hazardous as the action was a done deal.
By the time of the coup, Estonia was still waiting on Chechnya to deliver the 2 million US dollars that the Estonians had given a couple of billion roubles for. With the new government in mainland Russia, there was little hope for a friendly settlement and anyone with knowledge was legally forced to treat the matter as a state secret. The rouble deal remained under classification for 10 years with the veil of secrecy only being lifted in 2004 by the Parts government. The two million US dollars arrived just as Russia was breaking apart, and we now know that the money was spent on pensions and weapons from Israel (the only willing vendor at the time).
The new NSF government lacked the patience and lethargy that the Yeltsin government had - Makashov demanded the return of the Soviet currency soon after taking office. Laar responded that this could only be negotiated with the “legitimate government of Russia” and could only occur after the Estonian assets were unfrozen. To this, the NSF threatened war in case the roubles somehow went missing and then insisted on the old deal continuing rather than the “separate matter” of Estonian business assets being involved in it. A panicked Laar then set out to specifically assure the NSF of the continued presence of the roubles in the hands of the Estonian Central Bank, but no evidence aside from assurances by Laar and the Bank of Estonia to this end was presented. These assurances were shortly followed by statements that the NSF couldn’t get the roubles either way. This diplomatic masquerade followed for months and fueled tensions between Estonia and Russia. It is believed by some that the NSF was somehow aware of the rouble deal, although there is no evidence to this end. The Gaidar government likewise restated its desire for the missing roubles but was also essentially rebuked by Estonia. Gaidar actually did legally unfreeze Estonian assets in Russia, but by this time it was purely a de jure action that had no effect at all - left with little excuse, Estonia simply refused to hand over the roubles to Gaidar until the unfreezing “properly materialized.” In the new shared horror of the NSF, this spat soured relations between Estonia and the Kaliningrad government, which is credited with at least not aiding Estonia in what happened after.
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